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just compensation.” U.S. CONST . amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment’s just compensation clause is “designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.”5 Hence,
when the federal government restricts a land use, the
affected landowner may invoke the Fifth Amendment
and seek compensation.

For many decades, landowner s have complained that
zoning and various land use regulations unduly
restrict their choice of land uses. Zoning limits land
uses to those permitted in the particular zoning
district and prohibits all others.
Subdivision
regulations impose design standards on the
development of land. In recent decades, local
governments in particular have sought to pr eserve
open space, wetlands, and floodplains and to prohibit
their alteration and development in order to promote
public recreation, environmental and flood mitigation
purposes.1 Similarly, they have sought to preserve
historic structures and prevent their demolition or
substantial alteration. All of these measur es greatly
limit the landowners’ use and development options
and can destroy significant portions of the lands’
market value.
Arguing that these constraints
constitute regulatory takings, landowners have sought
compensation. The local governments respond that
these constraints are needed to protect public interests
and are valid exercises of the police power. Until ten
years ago, this regulatory ta kings debate had been
argued almost entirely in the state courts.

Most state constitutions have takings clauses similar
to the Fifth Amendment. Also, although the Fifth
Amendment does not apply directly to states, it
applies indirectly through the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST . amend. XIV. Thus, when a state or local
governmental unit restricts a land use under their
police power, the affected landowner may invoke both
the federal and state takings doctrines to seek
compensation.
Whether a regulatory constraint on land uses
constitutes a taking is a complex question. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized
four types of takings.6 (1) The government takes
possession of the land, or denies access to it.7 (2)
Government regulation causes too great a reduction in
the market value of the affected land. In so doing, the
government is destroying the market-based
expectations of the landowner.8 The Court’s decisions
do not define what reduction in value is too great and
constitutes a taking. One study 25 years ago of over
450 state open space and floodplain preservation
cases found that no taking occurred if the reduction in
value was less than 63 percent and a taking occurred
in all but exceptional circumstances if the reduction
in value was greater than 85 percent. In between, the
decisions were divided. (U.S. Water Resources
Counc. 1971) (3) Government regulation denies all or
most of the “reasonable economically beneficial or
productive uses” of the land. Conceptually a total
deprivation of lawful uses of land is functionally

But over the past ten years, the United States
Supreme Court has decided several regulatory takings
cases. Generally, the Court has found that regulatory
restraints on land development can be sufficiently
great so as to amount to unconstitutional takings,
requiring compensation, but that the restraint must
have an actual significant impact on the development
value of the land for a regulatory taking to occur.
Included in these cases are ones involving floodplains 2
and coastal zone management.3 Lower federal courts
have applied the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine to
wetlands.4
The law of regulatory takings is derived from the
Fifth Amendment, which provides that “private
property shall not be taken for public use, without
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equivalent to its physical appropriation. 9 (4) The
government requires the giving up of a
constitutionally protected “fundamental attribute” of
land ownership in exchange for the granting of a
discretionary benefit. In particula r, the government
cannot require a landowner to give up his right to
exclude the public from his land.10 Recently, the
Court has added a fifth type of taking. (5) The
government may not require the transfer of a property
interest substantially unrelated to the discretionary
permission the landowner is requesting from the
government.11

for fish, birds and wildlife and retains their
floodwater retention and water quality enhancement
capabilities. Often only passive recreational uses are
permitted in wetlands.
Protecting floodplains
preserves their flood mitigation capability and reduces
the likelihood of property destruction and reduces the
amount of flood disaster relief and flood insurance
payouts required.
In some cases, floodplain
regulation only allows passive nonstructural uses of
land. While it is clear that these are valid public
purposes under the police power, it is not at all clear
whether nonetheless they constitute a regulatory
taking.

However, none of these types of takings can justify a
landowner’s beginning or maintaining a public
nuisance. 12 Nor do they prevent the government from
regulating land uses to protect the public safety13 and
to prevent land use incompatibilities.14 In each case,
the question to be decided is whether the activity is
sufficiently obnoxious or dangerous to justify the
government’s prohibiting or regulating it regardless of
the adverse economic consequences on the affected
landowner.

A few state cases have found regulatory takings.15
But the major ity of state cases have not found a
taking, citing a variety of grounds: (1) the harm to the
public of filling wetlands outweighed any private
benefit;16 (2) the landowner reta ined some reasonable
development options and land value because the
filling prohibition applied only to a portion of the
wetland; 17 (3) the landowner retains significant
nonwetlands area to develop although the government
denied permission to develop any of the wetlands
area;18 (4) there was no loss of land value because the
landowner had only a unilateral expectation that
governmental permission would be granted; 19 (5) the
regulation prevented the creation of a public
nuisance; 20 (6) designation of land as a wetland is not
a facile taking, since denial of a development permit
is not foreordained;21 and (7) landowner purchased
land with notice of the wetlands regulation. 22

Doctrine Applied to Wetlands and Floodplains
Both wetlands and floodplain regulations often
involve denials of permission to fill low-lying lands
and to construct structures. Their purpose is to
preserve those wetlands and floodplains in their
natural condition.
The denial raises two constitutional questions. First,
does the denial involve any of the five types of
takings? The answer often is yes! Denial of
development permission usually causes a very
significant reduction in the market value of the land
[type 2, above]. Also, usually there remain few or no
economically beneficial or pr oductive uses of the land
[type 3, above]. Second, does the denial prevent the
creation or maintenance of a public nuisance, involve
preservation of some significant public interest or
prevent some significant public injury sufficient to
justify the regulation? If so, the regulation may be
constitutionally protected.

Most floodplain regulation cases also have rejected
takings objections, because not all development
options were denied,23 because there would be
dangers of enhanced flooding to the community if
floodplain development were permitted, 24 or because
the landowner had failed to seek a building permit.25

The United States Supreme Court and federal courts
of appeal have significantly altered the teachings of
state wetlands and floodplain jurisprudence. In the
cases discussed below, they have held that all
economic uses of land cannot be denied, that the value
of wetlands and floodpla in properties cannot be

Protecting wetlands preserves their habitat function
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make no contribution to the expense
of maintaining such facility. ... The
private interest, unless relieved by a
[compensation] award, sustains
what may well be a permanent
obligation to maintain pr operty for
public benefit, to carry the ta xes and
other expenses, and not to receive
business income from the property
in return. 27
Thus the court held that there could be a taking
involved and remanded the case to the court of claims
to determine what compensation ought to be awarded.
On remand, the court of claims determined that a 95
percent reduction in market value resulted and
awarded compensation of over $ 1 million. 28

reduced to less than approximately one-quarter of
preregulation market value, and that the prevention of
public detriment and public nuisance justifications are
limited to regulation of traditional common law public
nuisances and they do not extend to prevention of
environmental harm.
The effect of these decisions is that often individual
tracts of wetlands or floodplains cannot be preserved
in undeveloped condition under the police power. If
the government desires such total preservation, it
must acquire title or development rights. But if the
impact of development on the public would be
enjoinable as a traditional public nuisance,
development can be prohibited or substantially
limited.

Federa l Takings Cases

In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court opined in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles County29 that a total ba n on reconstruction of
camping facilities in a canyon floodplain could
constitute a taking. It was considering a temporary
development moratorium pending development of
permanent floodplain legislation. It held that if the
moratorium were later found to be a regulatory
taking, the landowner could be entitled to
compensation for the period of the moratorium. On
remand, the state court found no taking.30 The
importance of First English is that for the first time
the Court suggested that a total ba n on development
could be a regulatory taking even though the
regulation was imposed to protect the public safety.

This federal alteration of constitutional takings
doctrine began in the courts of appeal in the mid1980s in cases like Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v.
United States.26 The landowner brought an inverse
condemnation takings claim after the Cor ps of
Engineers denied a wetlands dredging and underwater
phosphate mining permit under Clean Water Act §
404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The court concluded:
Denial of the permit requires
[landowner] to mainta in at its own
expense a facility, the wetlands,
which by presently received wisdom
operates for the public good, and
benefits a large population who

The Court confirmed that view in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council in 1992.31 After plaintiff
had purchased two adjacent vacant beachfront lots in
a newly developed residential area, the state enacted
legislation establishing a no-construction zone along
the shore which included plaintiff’s lots. The state
trial court found that this “deprived [him] of any
reasonable economic use of the lots, .. . eliminated the
unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them
valueless,” and ordered payment of compensation of
over $ 1 million.32 The state supreme court reversed,
holding that prevention of beach erosion was a valid
exercise of the police power “to prevent serious
public harm” which did not require compensation. 33

At the same time the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have retained a rule that reduces the
impact of the Court’s revised takings doctrine. Under
the “whole parcel” rule, they continue to allow the
effect of regulation to be evaluated on the basis of the
whole area of the landowner’s property, not just on
the wetlands or floodplain portion. They continue to
debate the appropriateness of this rule, but until and
unless they change it to narrow the focus of the value
reduction evaluation, states and localities will retain
a grea ter ability to restrict development of wetlands,
shorelands, and floodplains than the revised ta kings
doctrine otherwise would suggest.
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cases, the Court stated:
[T]he distinction between regulation
that “prevents harmful use” and that
which “confers benefits” is difficult,
if not impossible, to discern on an
objective, value-free basis; it
becomes self-evident that noxioususe logic cannot ser ve as a
touchstone to distinguish regulatory
“takings” -- which require
compensation -- from regulatory
deprivations that do not require
compensation. 38
The Court was not prepared to allow recitation of a
noxious-use justification to “essentially nullify
Mahon’s affirmation of limits to the noncompensable
exercise of the police power.”39 Instead, the Court
held that a total deprivation of uses would be
noncompensable only if the regulation prohibited a
common law private or public nuisance:
Any limitation so severe cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in
the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership.
A law or decree with such an effect
must ... do no more than duplicate
the result that could have been
achieved in the courts -- by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely
affected persons) under the State’s
law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally ....40
Such a nuisance analysis would involve determination
of the degree of harm to public lands and to adjacent
private property posed by the applicant’s proposed
activities.41 For example, it would allow the state to
prohibit the filling of a wetland which would cause
flooding of adjacent land,42 but probably would not
allow the state to prevent the erection of structures on
plaintiff’s beachfront.43

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the state supreme
court, holding that there was a regulatory taking
because landowner had been deprived of all economic
uses of the land and because the value of the lots had
been reduced to zero. The Court stated,
[T]otal deprivation of beneficial uses
is, from the landowner’s point of
view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation. ... Surely, at least, in
the extraordinary circumsta nce when
no productive or economically
beneficial use of land is permitted, it
is less realistic to indulge our usual
assumption that the legislature is
simply “adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life.”
... [T]he fact tha t
regulations that leave the owner of
land without economically beneficial
or productive options for its use -typically, as here, by requiring land
to be left substantially in its natural
state -- carry with them a heightened
risk that pr ivate property is being
pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating
serious public har m.34
The Court observed that land can be preserved in its
natural state by formally condemning development
rights.35 Thus, the Court confirmed its suggestion in
First English that total deprivation of land
development and use options constitutes a
compensable regula tory taking.
South Carolina in Lucas had sought to justify the
regulation as one protecting the public from
significant public harm, relying on the long-standing
exception to compensability for regulation and
proscription of “harmful or noxious uses.36
Conceding that its recent decisions do not focus on
the noxiousness of the regulated activity, but instead
on the degree to which the regulation “substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests,” the Court stated
that the proper analysis is to determine whether the
primary purpose of the regulation is to prevent harm
or to confer a benefit on the public.37 In rejecting the
noxious-use exception in total deprivation of use

The impact of Lucas on land use controls law in
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In Lucas itself, the entire tract had been rendered
undevelopable, so the parcel definition question was
not addressed, other than in a footnote. 48 This means
that the courts may continue to offset the loss of value
of a portion of the property with development value
on the remainder to determine whether the total value
has been reduced too much under Pennsylvania Coal
or whether there has been a total deprivation of viable
uses under Lucas.

general and on regulation of wetla nds and floodplains
cannot be overestimated. It holds that preservation of
wetlands and floodplains cannot be accomplished by
uncompensated regulation if it results in an
elimination of all economically beneficial uses of the
land. Furthermore, such regulation can no longer be
justified by a purpose to prevent significant harm to
the public; only if that harm falls within traditional
interpretations of private and public nuisance may the
regulation cause total use deprivation without
incurring the obligation to pay compensation. No
prior Supreme Court decision has required that there
must be some residual beneficial use in order for a
non-nuisance restriction pr eventing public
inconvenience or promoting public amenities to be
valid and noncompensable. 44 The majority’s focus on
structur es as the essence of viable beneficial uses
calls into question the decisions of many state courts
holding that residual agricultural and recreational
uses are sufficient to avoid the “no beneficial use”
proscription. 45

The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Dolan v.
City of Tigard49 also addresses the “whole parcel”
question. The Court held that denial of development
rights to preserve an unobstructed floodplain on 10
percent of the whole parcel was not a taking. 50 This
conclusion perforce must result from application of
the “whole parcel” rule. Then, the Court held that
forced conveyance of title to that portion as a
condition for the granting of a building permit was a
taking. 51 This wa s the main thrust of the decision,
that the exa ction imposed as a condition for
regulatory permission must bear a “rough
proportionality” to the adverse public impacts being
mitigated by the regulation. The Court concluded
that conveyance of title to the undeveloped green
space was not necessary to protect the flood flow
capacity of the regulatory floodplain located on a
portion of landowner’s land; a development
prohibition on that portion of the land would be
sufficient.

Lucas probably will have a much greater impact on
wetlands regulation than on floodplain regulation.
Wetlands regulation often involves prohibition of all
development, whereas that is not true for most
floodplain regulation.
In floodways, where
prohibition of all structural and fill uses may be
imposed, there is a concomitant flooding threat fr om
development enjoinable as a private or public
nuisance, or in some states as a violation of the
common law of repelling floodwaters. By contrast,
failure to preserve wetlands rarely gives rise to a
private or public nuisance cause of action.

Lower federal courts since First English in 1987 and
Lucas in 1992 generally have refused to dismiss
taking claims based on permit denials,52 but will not
find a taking upon mere designation of land as a
wetland. 53 On the substantive merits, federal courts
sometimes have found regulatory takings,54 but more
frequently have not.55 State courts mostly have
upheld wetlands permit denials, finding no takings.56
Hence, although the language of First English and
Lucas is dramatic, the impact of these decisions on
takings analysis in wetlands and floodplains cases is
unclear.

Lucas also interplays with an earlier rule evolved by
the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts, the
“whole parcel” rule. Beginning in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City in 1978,46 the Court
has held that the reduction in market value analysis
must be made in the context of the whole parcel
owned by the affected landowner, not just the affected
portion of his land. This rule was affirmed in
Keystone Bituminous in 1987.47 Because Lucas
confirmed the “denial of all viable uses” type of
taking, what constitutes the “land” for purposes of
making that determination is of cr itical importance.

Even if Lucas is seen as a reduction in value takings
case, since Lucas involved a near total reduction in
value, it does not represent much of a change.
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However, First English applied the total deprivation
of use test to temporary development prohibitions. It
remains to be seen whether any temporary ban is
compensable or whether only those which exceed the
normal permit processing time. Lucas did not address
what land is to be considered in making the reduction
in value and total deprivation of use analyses, but the
lower federal courts in recent years, in cases like
Florida Rock, Loveladies Harbor and Formanek,
have focused the analyses on the portion of land
which is affected by the development constraint, and
have not considered the development and use options
retained on the remainder of the landowner’s land.
This is a major shift in focus from that employed
traditionally by the state courts. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Dolan applied the traditional
“whole parcel” rule in applying the taking tests. If
the lower federal courts continue to focus only on the
affected portion of land in applying the Pennsylvania
Coal reduction in value and the First English and
Lucas total deprivation of use tests, and the Supreme
Court continues to refuse to hear those cases, then the
combination of case decisions over the past ten years
will cause a dramatic limitation on the federal and
states governments’ abilities to preserve wetlands and
floodplains. Neither can be totally protected from
development, because the combination of decisions
requires that the landowner be left with some
significant residual value and significant economic
uses. Unless the governments can afford to purchase
those wetlands and floodplains, broad area
preservation will become impossible as a practical
matter.

Pennsylvania Coal involved a much lower reduction
in value holding that a 50 percent reduction was
excessive. Two lower federal cases have held that a
reduction in value in excess of 80 percent was too
much and constituted a taking.57
While those lower federal court reduction in value
cases found takings, they may also represent a breach
of the whole parcel rule. In Florida Rock I, the
reduction in value calculation focused on a 98 acre
parcel within a 1560 acre tract.58 In Loveladies
Harbor, the court of claims focused on 11.5 acres of
wetland and 1.0 acres of upland out of a total of 57.4
acres of unsold land within an original 250 acre
tract.59 In Formanek, the Corps denied a permit to
develop a portion of wetlands within a tract of 99
acres of wetlands and 12 acres of uplands; the
reduction in value constituted a taking.60 In each
case, the reduction in value calculation was based on
a portion of the entir e tract owned by the affected
landowner.
In 1994 in the remand of Florida Rock Industries, the
Federal Circuit suggested the possibility of
proportionate compensation. 61 On appeal, the court
held that the wetland property, where the Corps had
denied a dredging and mining permit, had substantial
speculative value in spite of the permit denial,
precluding a per se taking under Lucas.62 But it
suggested that “a partial deprivation” may have
occurred which could be a par tial taking.63 The court
suggested that a balancing test be used to determine
proportionate compensation. 64 However, the change
in the reduction in value calculation in Florida Rock
II does not appear to change the focus of Florida
Rock I on a portion of the entire tract for making that
calculation.

Nonetheless, the impact on floodplain regulation may
be less dramatic than on wetlands regulation. Even
though Lucas held that land use constraints to prevent
public harm of types not encompassed by nuisance
law are compensable, blocking or filling the path of
floodwaters may in many circumstances be
consider ed public and priva te nuisances. Hence, the
impact of Lucas’s limitation of the public harm
justifica tion for uncompensated land use regula tion
ought to be less severe on floodplain regulation than
on wetlands regulation.

Conclusion
Today, the reduction in value and total deprivation of
use tests for regulatory ta kings have been invigorated
by the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts. The percentage reduction in value that will be
“too much” probably has not been changed
significantly. Total deprivation of use was a taking
before the recent spate of Supreme Court decisions.
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